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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

BEN J. WAUNEKA

:

Case No. 14306

Defendant-Appellant

ARGUMENT
The threshold requirement for admission of hearsay testimony
under the "state of mind'1 exception set forth in rule 63(12) (a) of
the Utah Rules of Evidence is that it be relevant to some material
issue in the case.

In its brief, the respondent asserts that "the

explicit purpose for the statements of the deceased was to show her
mental state prior to her death as it related to the identity of her
murderer and probability of an accident.ff Brief of Respondent at 7.
As the court noted in United States v. Brown, 490 F.2d 758 (D.C. Cir.
1973):
A victim's extra-judicial declarations of fear or
the defendant are admissible under the state of mind
exception to the hearsay rule with a limiting
instruction only if there is a manifest need for
such evidence, i.e., if it is relevant to a material
issue in the case. Where there is a substantial
likelihood of prejudice to the defendant's case
in the admission of such testimony, it is inadmissible
if it bears only a remote or artifical relationship
to the legal or factual issues raised in the case.
(Emphasis Added) Id. at 774.
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The hearsay testimony admitted in the present case bears only
the most tenuous relationship to issues of the case.

The record shows

that the defense did not assert that the deceased was assaulted by
someone other than the defendant, but rather that there was no assault
at all.

Identity was therefore not an issue.

The question which

the jury was called upon to decide, on conflicting evidence, was
whether or not any assault took place.

Admission of the hearsay

testimony that the defendant had beat his wife in the past, introduced
on the premise that it showed her state of mind, would of its very
nature influence the jury in making its determination of whether
a similar occurence took place on the occasion in question.

This

result would follow in spite of the jury instruction that the
statements should not be used for that purpose.

Indeed, the state's

attorney, in his argument to the jury, suggested that the evidence
in the case showed the defendant to be an "experienced wife beater,ft
even though there was no competent evidence to that effect and such a
conclusion could only be drawn by using the hearsay testimony for
a purpose which the court had instructed the jury it should not be
used.

It is clear that while the state nominally offered the hearsay

testimony to show the deceased's state of mind, the real impact sought
from the testimony was to place before the jury statements indicating
that the defendant had beat his wife in the past.

Such highly

prejudicial hearsay testimony, offered under the guise of the state of
mind exception, has been uniformly held inadmissible even when it
is relevant to an issue of the case.

See, e.g., People v. Lew, 68

Cal. 2d 744, 441,
P.2d 942 (1968); People v. Hamilton, 55 Cal. 2d 881
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(

not a material issue, there is no justification for its admission.
See State v. Kump, 76 Wyo. 273, 301 P.2d 808 (1956).
The respondent alleges that the deceased's state of mind was
relevant because the defense contended that her death was the result
of an accident.

While it is true that this ground has been recognized

as a basis for admitting state of mind testimony, a close scrutiny
of this line of cases reveals that such is only the case when the
state of mind of the deceased is expressed in such terms as would
negate the claim that death resulted accidentlly.

For instance,

where the defendant claimed that the victim died as a result of an
accidental discharge of a weapon which she was holding, her statements
that she was afraid of guns, and therefore unlikely to handle them,
was relevant to a material issue of the case.

Here, however, the

deceased's statements in no way counter the contention that she
could have suffered injuries from falls while intoxicated.

Again

the supposed issue which the state of mind evidence is relevant to,
likelihood of accident, is seen to bear only the most tenuous relationship to the case, and in fact the hearsay testimony does not speak
to the probability of accident at all.

It is also important to note

that even if this testimony had been relevant to the issue of accidental
death, where the evidence implies past misconduct on the part of the
defendant so as to substantially prejudice his case, its relevance is
overriden by its potential for misuse by the jury.

People v. Lew,

supra.
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The respondent offered this court four decisions which it felt
were in accord with the trial court's ruling in this case.

One of

these decisions, Bustamonte v. People, 157 Colo. 146, 401 P.2d 597
(1965), is clearly inappropriate authority for the case at bar
because a simple review of its facts reveals that the state of mind
evidence received in that case was relevant to the issue of
self-defense.

The three other decisions cited by the respondent,

State v. Radabaugh, 471 P.2d 582 (Idaho, 1970), State v. Shirley,
7 Or. App. 166, 488 P.2d 1401 (1971), and State v. Gause, 107 Ariz.
491, 489 P.2d 830 (1971), were considered by the court in United
States v. Brown, supra, and found to be both poorly reasoned and counter
to the clear weight of authority.

As the court noted in Brown;

There are a number of other cases which have allowed
in testamony of this type on the basis of various errors
in reasoning or simple lack of concern. One of the principle
problems which brings this about is a court!s understandable
eagerness to find an "easy" rule, simple in operation. This
leads to a tendency to adopt a mechinistic approach devoid
of analysis. For example, in State v. Radabaugh, . . .
the Idaho Supreme Court, dealing with a hearsay declaration of
fear on the part of the deceased victim, simply identified
the statement as probative on the issue of the state of mind
of the declarant, referred to the fact that a limiting instruction
had been given and then pronounced it admissible in a conclusory
and offhanded manner. Such a simplistic approach sidesteps
any preliminary determination of relevance and does not begin
to weigh the possible prejudice contained in such statements.
Another group of cases seems to consider such hearsay
admissible if there are circumstantial indications of its
reliability or some type of corroborative evidence. For
example, in State v. Shirley, . . . the court found the
declaration of fear to have been made in a manner "'perfectly
natural' under the circumstances."
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Similarly, in State v. Gause, . . . the Arizona Supreme
Court, apparently attempting to adopt a "progressive11
approach, laid down a rule that such expressions of fear
are admissible as long as they have sufficient reliability.
While an attempt to break out of the confines of some of
the archaic niceties of the hearsay exceptions in favor of
admissibility dependent only on the presence of special
guarantees of reliability has something to commend it, this
only answers half the question. That is, the Gause court
(and the other courts which place so much reliance on
such indications of special trustworthiness) failed to move
on to the second question--that of relevance which also has
something to commend it. The court's rule simplified the
question of whether certain testimony falls within the state
of mind exception to the hearsay rule but entirely ignored
the relevance balancing process which seeks to avoid undue
and unnecessary prejudice and confusion.
The undesirable results of the application of such a
single-step approach become apparent in those cases in which
courts allow the admission of such hearsay declarations of
fear in spite of the fact that the state of mind of the
declarant simply bears too tenuous a relationship to the
issues in the case. For example, in State v. Shirley, . . '..
the court, on facts strikingly similar to those at hand here,
felt that the evidence should be admitted on the rather flimsy
ground that "the state had a right to show the state of mind
of the victim at the time of and shortly prior to the homicide
and for that purpose to show what circumstances as expressed
by the victim contributed thereto." Here again there is an
undesirable failure to address the relevance issue. The court
considered its task at an end merely by identifying the statement
as bearing on the victim's state of mind, neglecting to undertake
the vital step of balancing the necessity for the evidence and
it probative value against the stron likelihood of extremely
damaging prejudicial effects. (490 F.2d at 772-73)
It is further noted that in 1976 Idaho adopted the reasoning
in Brown as evidenced in the case of State v. Goodrich, 97 Id. 472,
546 P.2d 1186 (1967).
The error which the Brown court revealed in the cases cited
by the respondent was repeated by the trial court in the instant case.
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Additionally, this error was compounded when the court allowed the
state's attorney to argue to the jury that Mrs. Wauneka's statements,
that she feared her husband because he beat her in the past, were
evidence that such beatings had occurred.

Any such inference is clearly

impermissible, as the court recognized in its instructions to the jury,
and allowing the state's attorney to suggest otherwise totally negated
the effect of the court's limiting instruction.
The record shows that the trial court admitted into evidence
certain highly prejudicial statements, which were clearly and
admittedly hearsay, under the state of mind exception.

The record

further shows that the deceased's state of mind was simply not relevant
to any material issue in the case, and that the prosecution's sole
purpose in placing the evidence before the jury was to play upon the
inflammatory nature of the statements as they related to the defendant,
and not for the purpose of showing the deceased's state of mind.

Under

these circumstances the admission of the hearsay is error of the most
prejudicial nature.

As the court noted in Brown:

Quite a number of courts have confronted facts similar
to those here involving hearsay statements made by the
victim of a homicide which inferentially implicate the
defendant. Such statements by the victims often include
previous threats made by the defendant towards the victim,
narrations of past incidents of violence on the part of the
defendant or general verbalizations of fear of the defendant.
While such statements are admittedly of some value in
presenting to the jury a complete picture of all the facts
surrounding the homicide, it is generally agreed that their
admissibility must be determined by a careful balancing of
their probative value against their prejudicial effect.
Courts have recognized that such statements are fraught with^
inherent dangers and require the imposition of rigid limitations.
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The principle danger is that the jury will consider the
victim's statement of fear as somehow reflecting on
defendant's state of mind rather than the victim's-i.e., as a true indication of defendant's intentions, actions,
or culpability. Such inferences are highly improper and where
there is a strong likelihood that they will drawn by the
jury the danger of injurious prejudice is particularly
evident.
490 F.2d at 765-66. As stated by the court in People v. Purvis, 13
Cal. Rptr. at 804, 362 P.2d at 716 (1961):
It may be that an inference as to the victim's conduct can be
drawn from the victim's state of mind, but certainly no
permissible inference can be drawn therefrom as to the
defendant's character or actions.
Though courts are uniform in adopting this posture, the trial
court in the instant case allowed the prosecution to argue to the
jury that the hearsay testimony, purportedly offered exclusively to show
the deceased's state of mind, was evidence that the defendant
had beat his wife in the past and evidence from which they could
infer that he had beat her to death on the night in question.

Such

grevious error demands reversal.
CONCLUSION
A separate statement by Justice Bakes in State v. Goodrich,
supra, seems to reach the very heart of the problem when he stated:
The rule announced in State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d
582 (1970) which permits a witness to testify concerning
conversations with the deceased outside the presence of the
defendant is an intrusion on the right to confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, as announced in Douglas v. Alabama,380 U.S.
415, 85 S. Ct. 1074, 13 L.Ed. 2d 934 (1965), and Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S. Ct. 210, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970).
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Even if those statements are limited to direct evidence of the state of mind of the deceased, where that issue is relevant
in the case (see footnote 7 of the majority opinion),
they may not survive the broad sweep of the Sixth Amendments
guarantee.
(

DATED this

day of January, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
(

LYNN R. BR0V7N
Attorney for Appellant
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